

### 3 Moral systems - a structure

By discussing actions to begin with, we have wanted to stress their central role. As the foregoing sections show, it is justified to regard human patterns of action as strongly influenced by a fundamental process - evolution. The impact of morals on our actions must be connected with biological and social conditions.

To view morality as simply a mirror of material conditions is, however, to accord it a much too limited place in life. Religions and ideologies do not exist solely on an abstract level, but profoundly affect reality. There are great cultural contrasts between societies which, far from reflecting different physical conditions alone, owe to different choices among possible solutions. These choices are more than intellectual speculation and lead to concrete, qualitative distinctions.

Moral systems can be structured in many ways - frequently by setting entire systems against each other, as with Christian and Moslem morality. It may be helpful, instead, to follow a functional division in various dimensions, where classification of morals will correspond to the functional classification of actions. Such a division of morals is given by three spheres:

- \* A morality of integrity, which regulates individuals' rights to act in their own interest and on their own judgements.
- \* A reciprocal morality, whose rules are to hold for mutual benefit and harmonious coexistence.
- \* An altruistic morality, implying obligations for individuals to follow commandments to selflessly serve their fellows and ideals.

These spheres, too, are primarily functional, not normative. Here no implicit evaluation is made of a sphere as good or bad. Nor is it assumed that moral rules are inherently good and that bad ones are to be categorized as immoral or amoral. The three spheres naturally include principles which some people praise but others reject. The purpose of a functional division is to facilitate analysis and promote a well-founded normative assessment. We shall now examine each sphere in turn.

#### 3.1 Morality of integrity

The first questions about the individual's right to act in his or her own interest are: what should it be called, and should it really be treated under the heading of morality? We have considered the term "egoistic morality", but egoism is widely thought to be the opposite of morality, and discussion would be hindered if a controversial opinion were built into a definition.

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Clearly an individual has interests, views and intentions - yet which rights does he or she have to pursue these against higher powers and other individuals' interests? The whole point of moral philosophy is to seek rules for conflicts between different interests. One can, of course, object that the individual's only function is to serve God, humanity or the state. But such a notion, extreme to say the least, should not be allowed to dictate our terminology by equating altruism with morality. Every altruist knows that contrary values exist; so this notion is just a demagogical attempt to monopolize the positive term "morality" and prevent a meaningful debate. That self-interest is by definition morally despicable has been a popular idea because it is useful to demagogues. Its intellectual deficiency makes it completely unsuitable for a serious analysis.

Any clever crook is aware that it does not pay to argue in favor of egoism. He consistently pretends to be as selfless as possible, and his claims are restricted only when they become so incredible that he is exposed as a liar. In other words, the egoist who usually attracts opposition never stands up in defense of egoism. He sits among the saints who speak against it at debates. A straightforward discussion is aided by agreement between self-portraits and caricatures, so that advantages and disadvantages can be examined unambiguously - but the polished egoist presents himself with no resemblance to his accepted image.

Who, then, stands up for egoistic morality? Those who regard it as an honorable attitude, ethically and mentally superior to altruism in some or all respects. Those who do not see it as a shady philosophy, to be practiced in person without being preached in public, but believe that it deserves a place in the sun. Our term "morality of integrity" emphasizes the essential concept here, as well as to lessen the confusion which has resulted from the long propaganda war on egoism.

The most striking thing about morality of integrity is its expansion during the last few centuries. Previously, many states had an aristocracy with rights in relation to the monarchy, while the common citizen retained little integrity in relation to either these or the priestly élite. With the Enlightenment, and the American and French Revolutions, came new ideas. Conventions on human freedom, from Virginia in 1776 to Helsinki in 1975, have underlined the rights of individuals against the state. The main position is that such human rights are an overriding end in themselves. Another view is that they are functionally valuable in promoting the growth of a good society: thus one supports individual rights as a means, not as an end. This view also approves of individual interests, even when they conflict with official "social utility".

The collapse of socialism has weakened resistance to a fundamental aspect of morality of integrity - economic independence. Individual rights presuppose some economic independence, so that people do not live at the mercy of regimes. Economic life must allow real freedom of choice for the individual, both as a producer and as a consumer. At present, there are few who agitate for total state domination of economic life with very narrow leeway for individuality.

When connecting morality of integrity with actions, it is certainly egoistic actions that earn most moral approval. In debating morality, however, egoistic actions are easily treated as shameful events which have to be dressed up with a higher aim. An analogy would be that someone who paints because he wants to paint is silly, while someone who paints although he does not want to paint - due to an inner force which demands that he convey, say, a cubistic vision to his fellow human beings - is rather refined. Likewise, one buys a better house solely for the sake of one's children, and works overtime purely for the sake of one's company. The individual moral lies low and does not take the place, in the world of morality, which corresponds to the actions involved.

Even in decisions that affect oneself very greatly, the individual does not have full freedom of action, and this may seem surprising. According to Catholic belief, suicide is a grave sin, and numerous countries forbid it. The absence of a right to die painlessly can also illustrate the limitations on personal integrity. A right to become a drug addict is another area where strongly individualistic attitudes are opposed by different values.

It is reasonable to view kin selection as a group of actions influenced by such morality. We have a right to take care of ourselves and our children to the best of our ability, but rights over children are complicated. While a genetic concurrence exists that prevents basic conflicts of interest, dire threats to the rights of children do occur. In particular cases, deep feelings may arise for and against the parents: a timely intervention by the social authorities, one wonders, or a witch-hunt? Most people probably agree with the parents as responsible guardians, and with the social authorities only in situations of extreme abuse; yet exactly where the border runs is a sensitive matter. The growing rights of children can be regarded as an expansion in morality of integrity.

Women's more independent role belongs to this development as well. It makes a woman, not chiefly a family member, but an individual with goals somewhat different from her husband's. Two parallel changes have taken place in the family: decisions have been democratized, and they have been individualized.

Paradoxically, however, a connection is seldom made with egoism. Rights to act on one's own, for personal aims, are not gladly given this label. Do many people hope that an independent individual will work for other aims than his or her own? Or do they suspect crass motives of self-marketing? Whereas "self-realization" is by no means a dirty word, egoism is.

Semantic antagonism has cast a shadow on the coupling between self-interest and morality of integrity. In practice, egoistic actions receive firm support from the new morality which favors individual integrity. The terms "egoism" and "selfishness" continue to trigger moralistic reflexes, but it must be kept in context. Readers who can only consider it negative should, henceforth, imagine a less provocative term such as self-interest, again in order to save the discussion from despotic definitions. Nobody denies that a moral which

encourages bad actions is bad. What should be equally obvious is that there are moral principles which support the individual's self-interest and cannot be simply excluded from a moral debate.

### 3.2 Reciprocal morality

This heading may appear even more irrelevant to morals, but it has the greatest significance if we look at the social rules that directly affect actions. There has clearly been progress in the development of cooperation between individuals within the human evolutionary lineage. On the one hand, a fully voluntary reciprocity suffers limitations; on the other, a right to give up cooperation at any moment yields only a game of wait-and-see. Among the principal functions of society is to lay down rules for cooperation, as well as to exert moral and legal pressure on people who break the rules.

A little thought shows that many social rules are supposed to function by facilitating cooperation and coexistence. Traffic laws are a good example. Rules of economic life are mainly intended to create certainty about agreements and obligations; punishment for theft is meant to counteract one-sided transactions that involve no return services.

Besides all the regulations of public economic life, there are the reciprocal rules of private life. Here, a rule-breaker risks social repression, not prison. If one expects to be invited back, one must first invite in turn. Gratitude and return favors are constant demands on our behavior. Many of these rules are so prosaic that we see them not as moral rules, but as normal behavior. They lack the pretentious profile of altruistic exhortations. Yet the actions we really perform are, to a very large extent, based on reciprocal moral rules.

Often the two parties in a relationship do not have identical status: man and woman, rich and poor, buyer and seller. The purpose of rules is to establish some sort of balance. In various cultures, the parties are - or were - less equal than in the West today, but a reciprocal undercurrent is still detectable. Its legitimacy may seem dubious, as when a peasant works and his master provides protection. Even so, clarity and acceptance are two conditions for avoiding social conflict.

A basic problem in underdeveloped countries is that their reciprocal systems are too uncertain and unrefined. For instance, it is hard to start a trucking company and deliver food. If things go well, lots of people will try to collect favors - the customs officer wants a bribe when spare parts arrive, and the president's cousin wants to be an absentee chairman. In such surroundings, one does best by seeking a post at the Ministry of Transport and taking extra money from the dreamers who start companies. With a weakly reciprocal system, economic development is stifled and parasitism becomes attractive. The society turns into a kleptocracy.

Revolt and lawlessness characterize a society in which large groups are opposed to the reciprocal system - viewing the rules as

unjust, or the government as too weak to uphold them. In some measure, a state power can replace legality with violence, or the threat of violence. But this has its own limitations, and support or at least tolerance from many citizens is essential. A Soviet worker described reciprocal disharmony well: "They pretend to pay us and we pretend to work." A functioning reciprocal system is fundamental for every human society.

That sound reciprocal morality promotes reciprocal actions is self-evident, but the link between reciprocal morality and group-egoistic actions is more intricate. The first step, a right to organize groups of people, is based primarily on a morality of integrity. Organizational freedom is closely related to other freedoms of choice, and restricts the state's power to decide what is a good or a bad organization.

Many groups aim chiefly to exploit a common interest of their members by fostering internal activities, with no outward ambition. Any criticism of the group, as serving no useful purpose according to particular values, is answered mainly with a morality of integrity. The members are entitled to self-determination, even if the group's orientation contradicts a conventional notion of usefulness.

However, numerous groups are not principally devoted to an internal activity: they assert the members' interests against other groups and interests. When these special interests collide, great problems of conflict resolution arise. In Western states, a corporate spirit prevails. The special interests due to group egoism must, through cooperation and compromise, influence other groupings and ultimately find a resolution acceptable to all. Despite their occasionally predominant rattling of weapons, group-egoistic conflicts build upon a reciprocal morality of compromise.

How much energy is spent on defensive argumentation is striking. Positions are difficult to move forward, and more indignation focuses on "unacceptable moves backward". The right to refuse is much stronger than the right to realize new demands, and a kind of veto right creeps into the democratic corporativism. An old agreement possesses a status above its actual importance for the groups' interests, since it has acquired an extra moral weight by achieving reciprocal acceptance.

In confrontations between special interests, a softening agent is the fact that we all belong to several groups. The interests stand on different sides of many issues, and the choices for a person who belongs to several groups at once are far from clear. Special interests should bark, but not bite - and if rabid, they scare away members. An interest which arrogates the right to dictate solutions will earn external enemies, as well as violating the members' mandate; for the organization is meant to be an advocate, not a judge. The basic goal is to reach at least an unwilling acceptance of the opponent's solution.

One can, to be sure, assess this conservative effect diversely. It hinders comprehensive changes in a system, as consistent solutions face more trouble than do elaborate compromises. We all experience situations where we think an exaggerated respect for some special

interest has yielded a poor general solution. Compromise is not very clean. At the same time, it is proper to recognize the ability of such sluggish forces to make realistic judgements that limit the number of grandiose, radical failures. But conservative respect is not a full safeguard against failure, since a series of mistakes can have cumulative effects that become overwhelming. The confinement to marginal changes may cause a blindness to long-run threats. If a frog is dropped into hot water, it jumps out immediately to save itself; yet when it sits in a pot at a comfortable temperature that gradually gets warmer, it does not feel the danger until too late.

The special interests in a society must be able to find solutions so that they do not end in total confrontation with each other. They should be willing to seek compromises, not try to claim sovereignty in their sectors; a solution needs to have advantages for whoever is asked to embrace it. Without mutual advantages, there is no basis for cooperation or, sometimes, even for coexistence. A factor which enhances the possibilities of avoiding conflict between groups, then, is a strong reciprocal morality.

### 3.3 Altruistic morality

The third sphere, altruistic morality, is the officially dominant philosophy in many societies. One of its sources is religion, for which self-sacrifice is always far-reaching. This is most obvious in mortification practices, where one is trained to suppress individual desires and feelings in favor of a "higher" calling. Communist morality runs in the same ruts. A subject's plain duty is to labor in meekness toward the common goals ordained by the leader.

Mussolini, too, had no doubts about the individual's role in relation to the state and society. Two citations illustrate a central argument of fascism which recurs in other systems of thought: "Far from crushing the individual, the Fascist State multiplies his energies, just as in a regiment a soldier is not diminished but multiplied by the number of his fellow soldiers." "Everything in the state, nothing against the state, nothing outside the state."<sup><1></sup>

These may be dismissed as tainted echoes of now hollow glory, but the same idea has taken further forms. Many people listen with a lump in their throats to the old recording of John F. Kennedy's presidential inauguration speech: "Ask not what your country can do for you; ask what you can do for your country." The Sixties saw a bright budding of idealism. Kennedy was not, of course, referring to communist or fascist altruism - nor, it seems, primarily Catholic altruism, but to welfare altruism. The individual should make a sacrifice for the state, even if the benefit does not match the effort.

While a welfare state has several foundations, one of them is an altruistic claim that we are obliged to help our fellow human beings. The state is the charitable apparatus which aids underdeveloped countries and alcoholics: our capacity and generosity provide for their needs and incapacities. The second foundation consists of

advantages which an individual can get from the state: child support, retirement pensions, social payments, resettlement funds, cultural grants. The donor is relatively anonymous, and everybody hopes that somebody else is footing the bill. This is, indeed, to be hopeful.

Frédéric Bastiat wrote in the middle of the last century: "The state is the great illusion in which all believe they can live at the cost of others." A good deal of clear-sightedness lay in his aphorism.

Whether or not the second foundation of the welfare state is illusory, it is undeniably an attraction that rests on self-interest. If there is a strong faith that the state can afford large pensions, many citizens will prefer paying their contributions to the state, not to insurance companies - whose sales commissions and palatial offices show that the private sector has its own transaction costs. As so often happens, much can be gained through a coordination which is involuntary. A toll-charging motorway has extra costs in salaries for its ticket-punchers. Something must be done with an injured person who lacks private insurance. A general, basic solution need not be worse than an individual allocation of resources. Yet if a citizen doubts the state's ability and effectiveness, he chooses a private solution, both as consumer and as voter.

The welfare state's self-interested face is visible in spite of its altruistic cosmetics; still, a tone of rationality exists beneath the surface. For when we weigh its advantages and disadvantages, the system implies that we benefit from it. This aspect of welfare belongs to the sphere of reciprocal morality.

However, the first - altruistic - foundation of welfare states is their finer, if not also bigger, side. It does not depend on our fear of losing a job or having an accident, but appeals to us for help with problems which we do not believe will ever afflict us. This is the side whose advocates say that it saves us from selfish obsession with our wallets. The validity of these claims should now be examined, taking a clue from the origins of state power.

In many societies, the altruistic side can be seen arising from a group-egoistic project. The earliest civilizations had a universal denominator: the river named Nile, Euphrates, Tigris, Indus, or Yellow. Irrigation of farmland gave rich rewards as long as people could manage such a huge social enterprise. Floods were to be controlled so that they brought fertility, not destruction of settlements. Cooperation was more beneficial than individual tillage and trust in the next rainfall. Great irrigation systems evidently enjoy group-egoistic rationality. But the state powers behind them had other ambitions than distributing the whole harvest to the citizens. Soon new joint projects of dubious common value sprang up. The Pyramids may be good for modern tourism; they please us as, perhaps, they did Isis and Osiris. For all that, they are weird monuments to suffering and sweat in the cause of a vision - an altruistic vision of high ideals embodied in gods, pharaoh and culture.

Religion can be traced to various sources. People have always preferred a definite answer, even if wrong, to an uncertain one. Every question that had no right answers could be answered by religion

and, with this intellectual capacity, it succeeded in creating an apparent rationality for actions that were not in the actors' interests. Bending the knees toward Mecca may be viewed as a small preparation for other privations. Predictably, the spiritual and worldly powers united in an effort to make people think less in their own interests, and more in the state's. Projects rooted in group egoism are refined, or reduced, to altruistic ones.

Although most altruists would emphasize the generous aspects, we must come back to the significance of morality for warlike aspects. The state's survival has owed to its maintaining a military strength which keeps neighboring states out - and which, if possible, can subdue them. A military system does not rely on voluntary assent to its incitements, but traditionally exerts an element of force. The fiery cross had a noose of rope dangling from one end, as a reminder that whoever failed to defend the community could look forward to being hung from its trees. When persuading people of something as repulsive as the duty to risk their lives, it is seldom a matter of using either "the carrot or the whip", and nearly always of using both together. Altruism is a good carrot which leads the soldier to gaze upon higher values than his own life. Its ability to motivate is perhaps the chief reason why altruism occurs in human cultures. States with a morality of willing sacrifice possess, in addition to their apparatus of force, an advantage over states with that apparatus alone. A capacity for ideological crusades can be a decisive factor in struggles between competing groups. Empires are built faster in the presence of priests than without them.

Altruism is not only a carrot. It lends support to a third essential component in the exercise of power: legitimacy. Isolated members of society may be punished, or threatened with punishment; yet this hardly suffices as a general method of exercising power. A single prince could not compel an entire people even if he were Hercules. He needs a circle of helpers who have a shared outlook and interest, and who accept his authority as legitimate for the common project. This is also an important basis for obtaining redress from ordinary folk. The altruistic motive provides a means of acquiring such legitimacy - a respectable, though diffuse, intent that endows its greatest champion with authority and a function. In a less worthy subculture like the Mafia, we see a structure with the same three factors. Murder and bribes serve well as the whip and carrot, but legitimacy is necessary too. A series of special game-rules and lofty ideals for the operations, including family honor and prosperity, are key ingredients. For larger organizations, what count are all-embracing ends such as a race or class, God or mankind.


### 3.4 Conflicts between the spheres

The classic opposition is that between morality of integrity - alias egoism - and altruism. Much anger has been vented over the former's blend of lowliness with strength, and advocates of altruism have always stressed that vast progress would follow if their own morals

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were given more influence. In a sense, this view is so self-evident that it demands no explanation; but the stress is on how to bring about such a desirable change. The continual attack upon egoism's treacherously camouflaged mine-field is, however, not the most interesting front of the conflict.

Let us add the three spheres to our earlier figure:



This illustration tries to make two points. First, altruism is considered the higher morality, and it dominates the world of norms and moral philosophy, accounting for its visual size and position here. Secondly, moral rules are not the only things that guide and influence our behavior, as is indicated by the large arrow of evolution.

Morality can be viewed as a dynamic conflict between the three spheres, as well as between alternatives within a sphere. Morality influences action partly within a category, and partly between categories - as when asking, respectively, how best to bring up a child, and how to make an egoistic counterfeiter obey reciprocal rules of payment. In each sphere, there are alternative proposals for rules, but they have a unified tendency. The morality of integrity aims chiefly to strengthen individual action by opposing what it regards as bad actions in the other categories, for example when an individual is forced into conventional behavior by a family, by "everyone else", or by the state. Greater independence would lead to better consequences. Reciprocal morality touches upon problems that could be solved to advantage by cooperation. Altruism sees many tasks that should be dealt with by individuals acting selflessly, in both direct and indirect senses. Thus, the different spheres must not be taken to affect only "their" categories, but as all affecting a broad spectrum of human actions.

On numerous issues, conflict arises between a morality of integrity and a reciprocal morality. How free should an individual be in relation to his agreements: shall he be able, for instance, to easily dissolve a contract of employment, marriage or partnership? Where is the line distinguishing liberty from responsibility? Yet the two kinds of morality are connected by a common basis, self-interest in the broad sense. Generally, cooperation - as well as written or unwritten rules - is no sacrifice for the individual, but serves his own interests. The conflicts between these two spheres are more a question of border skirmishing than of total opposition.

The great antagonism is that between reciprocal morality and altruism. Many social functions can proceed upon either the one or the other foundation, and in much of life it would be possible to replace altruistic with reciprocal morality. Why do so, or why not?

Choosing between ideals is complicated if one cannot be satisfied with a selection of pretty words. A phenomenon such as courage may be viewed in various ways. One is to emphasize the moral superiority of

courage over cowardice. Next comes a corresponding objection to foolhardiness, and soon there is normative agreement that we should be brave, not cowardly or foolhardy. According to Aristotle, courage is to be praised as the golden mean between two undesirable extremes. This is not an unjustifiable model, though debaters will differ as to which specific actions belong in which category.

Another approach is to consider the behavior in overall terms. Courage may well be preferred as the opposite of cowardice, while foolhardiness is avoided as the opposite of sensibleness. The problem is that these pairs of opposites lie very close together and can be merged. Courage and foolhardiness are interpretable as good and bad forms of risk-taking, respectively, whereas cowardice and sensibleness are two forms of caution.

When preaching a social virtue, it is realistic to expect that praise of courage will also produce foolhardiness, and that admiration for sensibleness will yield cowardice too. Many human patterns - of action, behavior and value - reveal this combination of a good and a bad version, which are difficult to separate. Hence one has to adopt a position between risk-taking and caution. In individual cases a golden mean is sought, but first a strategic decision arises, about a package of overriding rules with a main orientation. We know that economic decisions associate high profits with high risks, so a first step is the decision to weigh risk-taking against caution. Culture and social morals influence this orientation. In the days of the old Icelandic poem "Havamal", a different normative attitude existed toward the risk of violent death: "An unwise man feels certain of living forever, if wary of battle. But age will make his bones rattle, even if spared by the spear."<2>

On the overall level, therefore, it is less a question of classifying particular actions as good or bad, than of reaching general judgements and choosing packages. Freedom of expression is such a collection of overall norms. Most of us are so tolerant that we believe a lot of opinions are valuable although we ourselves do not share them. In addition, we hold that some may indirectly have positive effects by stimulating debate and reflection. A further group of opinions earn no positive remarks, but we support their free expression because this package appeals to us. Some deviants can be removed by a few special rules with no bad side-effects, yet any more attempts at improvement would be countereffective. An effort to cut out swollen lies is dangerous for truth-bearing arteries: the possible failure overshadows the conceivable success.

Social morals do not work like a smörgåsbord table where one can pick at will. They present a system choice in which advantages and disadvantages are strongly coupled to each other. There is a great difference between good and bad packages, making the choice important. The most fundamental package choice in moral philosophy is whether one can select, or eliminate, an entire sphere of morality.

The moral justification for integrity's sphere has been seriously challenged. This criticism continues, but now with diminished force. In the present book another sphere, that of altruism, is questioned as

to its grounds for existence. What are the results of weighing good and bad consequences of altruism? Would a different moral principle yield better results?

Since the altruistic category of action is a cultural product, it is quite possible that this category would disappear without massive support from altruistic morality. There are, without doubt, good altruistic actions which nothing requires us to oppose, such as selfless blood donations. One effect of a weaker altruistic morality might be the formation of an interest organization for blood donors - which might only make them nostalgic about earlier idealism. When choosing between packages, we should be prepared either to gain some disadvantages or to lose some advantages, however undesirably. Usually we are prepared to support freedom of expression despite its negative features, and to reject fascism even if it were the best social system for getting the trains to run on time.

Altruistic morality has been deeply undermined by the retreat of religion and socialism. Nonetheless, it is still influential. The more we experience of normative emphasis, and the more of visionary speculation, the more altruism there is. Its dominant position should be questioned beyond the mere complaint, whether due to caution or indignation, that its practice is in sharp disagreement with its theory. Instead, a more fundamental hypothesis should be tested: would we have a better society if an altruistic morality were replaced by a reciprocal one? Would the world have fewer willing givers of blood on the battlefield, even if also in the hospital? The implications are many and complex, but few if any issues have such importance for moral philosophy. In what follows, this question is to be illuminated from diverse perspectives that are essential for a judgement.

### 3 Summary

Departing from the categories of action in the previous chapter, morals and moral systems have been divided into three spheres, which regulate the individual's rights and duties in different contexts.

Morality of integrity concerns limits on the individual's right to act in his own interest against those of other individuals or groups. A sphere of reciprocal morality deals with rules for various forms of cooperation among individuals or groups. An altruistic sphere has to do with the obligations of individuals and groups to actively acquire advantages for others, or reach "higher goals" while ignoring personal benefit.

Morality can be viewed as a dynamic conflict between these spheres - in which morality of integrity seeks to maximize the individual's freedoms and rights (egoism), reciprocal morality his effectiveness in cooperation, and altruistic morality his sacrifices for others. What unites the first two spheres is his wider self-interest, since effective cooperation is of benefit to both parties. Thus an overemphasis on morality of integrity at the expense of

reciprocal morality can be disadvantageous to the individual in a long-run or broader perspective, and he has a natural interest in achieving a balance between these spheres. Yet the altruistic sphere, advocated by traditional moral philosophy and religion, is diametrically opposed to the other spheres because of its focus on selflessness. Altruism's main impact is not the reputed one of counteracting egoism, but the subversive one of thwarting reciprocal morality.

### Notes Chapter 3. Moral systems - a structure

1. Mussolini, *Fascismo*, in Schmandt, *A History of Political Philosophy*, p 456 and p. 454, respectively.
2. *Havamal* p. 30.