

7 War and peace - and reciprocity

The focus in this chapter will be on political conflicts. How is the possibility of resolving them influenced by morality? As usual, altruism makes lofty claims. It has not succeeded in stopping the misery of war, but it is said to exert a strong restraining force, without which the misery would be even greater. Altruism is oil on the waves of political unrest and, once a clash of arms has broken out, it gives sound guidance for how to restore peace. We shall scrutinize these claims.

Unity against an external enemy is almost always a basis of the cohesiveness in a group. At every scale of detail, inner conflicts are then submerged as energy is mobilized for the joint project. War is one example, but there are many others. An organization or a company is easily fragmented by struggles for power and conflicts of interest when the pressure from outside diminishes. Those with an altruistic outlook commonly assert that external pressure is what compels us to act egoistically: we are, after all, good at heart. Yet experience shows that solidarity is proportional to external pressure - no threats, little cooperation. Thus international cooperation cannot be built on such thin soil as human love; it must be a deliberate defense against threats to personal and national existence. Man is his own worst enemy.

7.1 Imperialism

With an eye to history, it is very likely that the oldest collective battles were due to rational group egoism. A tribe which conquered another and increased its hunting territory gained an advantage for the individual members, and for the group as a whole. This manner of thinking is assumed to linger on in the modern world, but the assumption deserves inspection.

The question of whether war is rational has been asked many times. While the answers vary in argumentation, perhaps the most frequent conclusion has been that an economic rationale is involved. The weapon industry, or "military-industrial complex", obviously plays a role. To say that arms dealers make money from war is, however, a bit trivial. By the same token, a proposal for environmental improvement could be attributed to the economic interests of some supplier. Any policy entails both winners and losers. The main issue is not whether particular individuals or subgroups benefit, but whether the entire country benefits, from an expansion - that is, whether the sum of advantages for certain groups exceeds the cost for others. It is in this sense of profit that the evaluation of imperialism becomes relevant.

A classic theory of imperialism was formulated by the British

economist John Hobson, its leading proponent being Lenin.<1> Its essence is that, when returns on capital decline, the capital migrates to undeveloped countries; thereby imperialism saves the developed economies from collapse. Other, semi-Marxist analyses have continued this tradition. An explanation for the absence of revolution in developed countries was that the profits from poor ones enabled capitalism to bribe the working class - which can only mean that huge rewards were circulating in rich nations. It can also be seen as an indirect advocacy of imperialism, since it implies that the policy, although morally wrong, is good for those nations. Direct champions of industrialism make a different moral judgement, but the same economic assessment: in the long run, an imperialistic state earns back its military costs and the citizens feather their nests. Still, we may wonder whether that inference is true, even if it is supported by diverse lines of thought.

Much of social criticism moves in well-travelled ruts; sinning is enjoyable and imperialism profitable, while both are despicable. In the conventional view, moral blame for imperialism is laid upon the motherland's elite, not its masses; yet these masses are among the beneficiaries, not the underprivileged. In this way a less moralizing, and more important, objection is avoided. Could it be that imperialism is not at all in the motherland's interest, but only in the ruling elite's? The hypothesis is worth study, and we might consider it in the light of the two contemporary empires, those of Britain and Communist Russia.

As a proof of profitability in this context, it is usual to call attention to the misery in colonies. Emaciated Indians and impoverished Poles become clear evidence for a crime - the theft of prosperity. But empires are not zero-sum games, and one party's loss is not necessarily another's gain. It is both possible and common that a system functions destructively. Today, Russia does not bear witness to a thriving country that has successfully engaged in extortion. There is a fair chance that the motherland, not the colony, has paid for most of the military apparatus which was the empire's backbone and primary expense. During the imperial heyday, it was easy to embrace theories of domination by trading conditions; however, the potential opportunities for calculated extortion are confronted by an overriding principle, the law of least resistance. The leading elite often finds it simpler to get the masses in the motherland to stand up for the empire, than to extract resources from a colony. The motherland has to make the main contribution, and the colony suffers from mismanagement rather than extortion.

Germany's progress until World War I shows that the lack of an empire is not a great disadvantage. In the British Empire, certain circumstances are opposed to the conventional view. England was substantially weakened already before the Empire declined, and no populistic party was heard to say that the Empire should be kept because the people's economic interests were at stake. Instead, the Empire was regarded as a sacrifice, a gift to civilization - which became ever more dubious, and something England could not afford.

A further example of economic extortion is the tax dispute between England and her American colonies, which led to the birth of the United States. England insisted that the colonies should pay for the military units stationed there. The conflict dealt largely with distribution of power between the British government and local groups in America; but in material terms it is hard to agree with the Americans, since the sums of money that aroused such indignation were very small. The tea tax brought in 20,000 pounds, and other taxes came to a similar total. These must be compared with the expenses of the English military and the civil administration in America, amounting to some 200,000 pounds each. In short, the colonies cost the Crown more than ten times what they paid in taxes.<2> Hence, England's demands seem modest indeed - and still the result was revolution. This illustrates the difficulty of carrying out a sort of extortion which, once condemned by everybody, is believed to be a real phenomenon.

We may conclude that imperialism, far from being good, is worse than conventional critics suppose, because it has even less material justification. It cannot so much as benefit the motherland's own people, but serves only the interests of a minority. This judgement raises other possibilities than that of moral indignation. A central objection to imperialism is now its failure to satisfy the self-interest of the motherland. Deeper awareness of such economic irrationality, along with democratic control, would be preventive measures with significant prospects of stopping imperialistic expansion.

In questions of this nature, the people's opinion is a step ahead of avant-garde morality. It can be doubted whether there is normally a strong national desire for imperialistic projects. Consider the reaction that followed the triumphant German campaign against Poland in 1939. Hitler had received loud acclaim for uniting the German nation. His public approved of swallowing the Saar, invading the Rhineland, and annexing Austria, as attested by the vast demonstrations and unanimous plebiscites. Despite that, assiduous propaganda could not turn the occupation of Poland into a cause of the German people. Few showed up for the victory parade in Berlin. George Kennan, then the American ambassador in Germany, noted the citizens' attitude: "Not even the most frantic efforts of professional Nazi agitators could provoke them to demonstrations of elation or approval." General Ritter von Leeb wrote a similar observation in his diary on October 3: "Poor mood of the population, no enthusiasm at all, no flags flying from the houses. Everyone waiting for peace. The people sense the needlessness of war."<3> Nor did the conquest of France appeal much to the majority. The war was pushed onward, not by sweeping German nationalism, but by a ruling group whose visions knew no limits - and by a people which did its duty to the authorities.

Our inferences from economics and politics do not suggest that there is an economic rationale in imperialism. This notion ought to be challenged, instead of first blandly accepted and then morally attacked. What fuels imperialism is not economic rationality but the interest of leaders. In their urge to be "alpha-alpha" achievers,

hearing only the wingbeats of history, rulers tend to forget prosaic obligations. Democratic controls on their ambition are essential.

A dictator, too, needs popular support for his projects. He may call upon economic rationality, which is always a strong argument even if it cannot be mentioned in all public arenas. But further motives do no harm, especially when these can be exercised consistently; and altruism provides convenient alternatives. One might, for instance, attribute imperialistic endeavors to high and virtuous purposes such as God, civilization or socialism. Good aims enable a leader to pursue goals outside the national group interest. This crusading capacity is lessened by skepticism about altruistic morality.

For the Romans, "empire" was a positive word connected with unity, peace, civilization and culture. Their Empire represented a good way of life, and the bad variants had to wear a label of barbarism. In our time, "empire" has itself become a loaded term, so the good variant has taken shelter under rubrics such as international solidarity.

Political moralizing has not found it easy to distinguish good from bad imperialistic projects. China's Communist party evaluated the Soviet empire initially as an uplifting example of international brotherhood, but ultimately as repugnant social imperialism. Hitler and Stalin were rabid critics of the British Empire. Many other observers are equally opposed to certain kinds of imperialism, while warmly favoring other kinds. The heat of feelings on both sides does not help to clarify the line between them. This analysis is also blurred when the good kinds are undermined by describing them as sacrifices, and the bad ones are supported by claiming that they agree with the motherland's self-interest.

From a traditional socialist viewpoint, capitalism is unusually bellicose and ruthless, and causes a brutalization of society. This accusation need not, of course, be justified or even meant seriously, as it coincides with a propagandistic desire: capitalism should be so brutal as to repel more people in outrage. The church has long propagated such a message - the force behind war and misery is materialism.

However, brief reflection yields a quite contrary picture of capitalism: a shopkeeper-like determination to discover solutions in any situation, to seek compromises and ignore past crimes if the criminal can create new business. According to Lenin: "The capitalists are prepared to sell everything, even the rope that will hang them." We continually see examples of this mentality, which is more reminiscent of a whipping-boy than a warrior; and it is not surprising. A war may stimulate the demand for some products, and increase some investments, but means on the whole that the state confiscates manpower and purchasing power. The capitalist sector shrinks, and the public sector grows with rationing, tax rises and authoritarianism. A few capitalists earn money when consumption shifts from butter to cannons, yet the majority work for the private sector. These build cars instead of tanks, and refrigerators instead of automatic rifles. A war also involves a further risk that capitalists abhor: the loss of capital when factories are destroyed. A capitalist dreams of more prosperity,

not about Arches of Triumph and heroic death.

Hitler made a comment on violence and ideals which has often been confirmed, not least by his own practices: "The lack of a great, innovative idea has always been a limitation to fighting ability. Conviction in the right to use even the most brutal weapons is always allied with a fanatical belief in the necessity to struggle for a revolutionary new order on this earth. A movement that does not fight for such a superior goal and ideal will never resort to the ultimate weapon."<4>

The liberal societies - those that have both capitalism and democracy - behave very peacefully. Such countries have almost never been known to wage war against each other, and they are usually the attacked parties when in conflict with totalitarian regimes. The egoism which emerges in capitalism has thus not been a source of more war, as the altruistic tradition claims; it has been a source of less violence.

(We will use the term "liberal" in a wide philosophical sense, to denote proponents of welfarism as well as libertarians - that is, not in the more specific sense that a liberal in the United States is a proponent of the welfare state, while in Europe a liberal is skeptical on this issue.)

7.2 Cooperation or isolationism

Now that the conventional perspective on imperialism is visibly full of holes, we should consider whether other dramatizations agree with reality. The direct consequences of war are apparently just as ghastly and widespread as is generally admitted, and the victims of war have clearly multiplied in modern times. World War I witnessed a climax in the number of soldiers taking part and dying in individual battles. Since then, mortality among soldiers has decreased but civilian casualties have mushroomed, and the harvest of war gives no sign of ending. So-called "smart bombs" are only a deviation from the mainstream of indiscriminate killing, whose chief emblems are nuclear weapons and raise the question whether it is at all possible to exaggerate the destructiveness of war. Churchill, in a speech before Parliament in 1901, rightly foresaw that "the wars of the peoples will be more terrible than those of the kings".

As for the indirect consequences of war, matters are radically different. Military defeats have repeatedly proved to be anything but fatal. France has been beaten for hundreds of years after failing in her plans of expansion, but she has always soon regained a prominent status. The comeback of Germany and Japan after World War I follows the same pattern. Defeat is not equivalent to a nation's death, as its leaders pretend; Hitler's and Napoleon's countries did not dissolve when they fell. Neither do states which are annexed meet a fate worse than death. In many cases the two peoples integrate, as did the Anglo-Saxons and Normans in England; or else imperialism collapses, due to the faulty rationality we have discussed above, and nations

arise from the empire. Every upheaval has cost human lives, yet large-scale genocide is still exceptional. In view of war's indubitable awfulness, in comparison to an occupation's limited damage and gradual dissipation, it is tempting to speak for extreme pacifism.

With a low threshold of resistance, though, many people will use weapons in order to win control of society - both within and between countries. If a state does not protect its monopoly of violence on the domestic scene, the violence among groups will quickly escalate, and may result in support for a tyrant who takes power to restore calm. Likewise, international assailants are abundant; the planet's geography is a jungle of historical frontiers that have been erased but not forgotten. These often pop up in programs for correcting injustices against a nation, history, and the future. To give way before the horrors of war is to invite the scourge of violence.

In which situations, then, is it right to practice violence? One category is the defense of one's country. Such isolationistic defense is morally acceptable to most of us, but the question is whether it suffices. For military giants like America and Russia, it would be - but not for small nations. Some kind of collective security is needed, and this might be formulated with the Gulf War as an illustration: if a foreign power occupies a small country, he must be thrown out.

The Gulf War was ridiculed by some irredeemable critics for being egoistic. But this was precisely what made it possible to unite and intervene. A nonaggressive policy is in the interest of most regimes, both democratic and dictatorial, since the threat of being attacked by a stronger enemy tends to be greater than the attraction of attacking a weaker neighbor. And a lower risk of foreign occupation is desirable for peoples, even if their rulers are not paragons of virtue. Because of a shared interest, not self-sacrifice, there are realistic chances for a broad anti-aggression guarantee that would be a solid step toward a more secure world.

Muddled moralizing in regard to oil has created confusion about the conflicts in the Middle East. Whatever the industrial nations do, it is held to be influenced by our interest in oil, and thus to be shameful. Why the critics place so much moral value on a high oil price is an issue that calls for arguments, considering that people object when the producers raise the price for consumers. Iraq, during its war with Iran, was criticized in certain circles for supposedly having an alliance with this oil-consumer interest. But suddenly the same Iraqi regime turned against the industrial world's oil interest. This has happened during the Kuwait invasion as well as alongside Iraq's efforts to sell oil - while the United Nations maintains an embargo for political reasons that presumably decrease the oil supply. The interest of oil consumers in these conflicts is neither clear-cut nor reprehensible; yet the idea that, like an evil genius, it controls politics in the Middle East continues to seem a sophisticated and praiseworthy insight.

The United Nations' efforts in other respects are often good examples of the problem with "positron principles" (see Chapter 4). This is fine when it comes to drafting principles, since different

opinions cannot conflict if they are made to sound lofty and vague enough. They resemble a child's wishful letter to Santa Claus: it is easier to think of a few more gifts than to establish priorities. Not even when the UN goes into action has it thought out a plan for action. How a military intervention will be financed is normally unknown - one simply hopes things will work out. An official of the UN has described its operations as a "financial bungy-jump".<5>

If the UN troops encounter resistance, the solution is again unknown. Usually they compromise by taking no offensive measures whatever, remaining as passive as possible and shooting only in self-defense. But the best response for a limited purpose is to send no troops at all to the unpleasant area concerned. Elections are supervised, though without knowing what to do if the loser rejects the result. The UN gives food and money to the fighting soldiers who cause the misery, so that some of its assistance will get through. Visions of a happy Christmas Eve are entertained, together with fuzzy notions of how to find the way. That war causes death is a constant surprise to angelic UN personnel, and their policy is a combination of unfounded optimism with chronic impotence. To prevent a breakdown, one must not only limit the goals and lay down priorities, but also increase the force behind the principles one seriously wants to obey. This means less devotion to things one wishes for, and more to things whose price one is actually prepared to pay.

Vagueness and weakness are a challenge to the opponent's fighting spirit, and declarations in the UN General Assembly are of little significance if it has no ability and will to act. As Thomas Hobbes said, "And Covenants, without the Sword, are but Words, and of no strength to secure a man at all."<6> The point of an anti-aggression principle is that it should be clear, hard, and not too burdensome for the UN. In today's world, the opportunities for such a policy are substantial.

Iraq's invasion of Kuwait was not the first attempt of its kind: attack, be condemned, collect the booty and wait to be widely, if not formally, accepted. An effective common policy to deal with this sort of aggression does not consist primarily of moralizing, but of actions that are brutal and unequivocal. The counterattack must be aimed at the attacker, not just the troops in the occupied land, and the explicit intention should be to eliminate the aggressive regime. An intervention's possible consequences, such as civil war or national fragmentation, present no restrictions either - the aggressor ought to have recognized them earlier. While the manner of fighting should be civilized, guarantees cannot be given for very limited civilian casualties. Nor should the UN take responsibility for rebuilding the aggressor's country.

The discussion of a "new world order" displays familiar flaws. Too much ambition is accompanied by too much restraint of real action. A tougher and better-defined policy would have good chances of making a strong impact and stopping virtually all aggressive projects. An offensive dictator is unmoved by moral sermons, but is greatly influenced by the existence of a superior military power that will

strike him without hesitation or pardon.

Civil war and oppression

There are many other types of conflicts than those between countries. An interesting question is how to regard civil war when one of the parties has our sympathy. Does our involvement or solidarity stop at medicine, credit, delivery of weapons, or intervention? The borders between various forms of support are flexible, since humanitarian aid for one party enables it to transfer more of its own resources from humanitarian into military activity. Such forms are so difficult to distinguish and regulate that considerable effort and prestige can be wasted in debating them.

A firm line does apply to fighting personnel. Foreign involvement can be limited by a total ban on both regular troops and volunteers - a consistent policy against direct military participation. If a conflict is to be confined, this seems the crucial criterion. Foreign money and weapons can make a big difference, but soldiers are always a necessary ingredient. If soldiers could also be brought from abroad, the country would need only some greedy politicians who either bless or curse the government - and these are easy to find. Disengagement of the "people's interest" from the real people is certain to cause free interpretation and abuse.

Intervention in places like Yugoslavia and Somalia is often proposed. The enormous suffering urges that something be done, but there are weighty arguments for a cautious policy. The task would be colossal, and tampering with a civil war has seldom been successful: democratic virtues are soon corrupted. Laudable entry into an arena such as Somalia is followed by rapid disillusionment. War is a dirty handicraft that should be expected to include a few bad bombings, a new Song My, and then a regime appointed by the UN - not the people. Democratic intervention has a hard time being democratic. How many of us want to die for an ethnic conflict between two other groups? When foreign states and their citizens have no deep interest in intervening, this is a plain reason for not doing so. A fair number of moralists say the exact opposite.

Occasionally a detested regime has been eliminated through efforts from abroad. Tanzania's attack on Idi Amin in Uganda, and Vietnam's on the Khmer Rouge in Kampuchea, are fascinating examples. Even though the shining knights had dubious democratic credentials, their lustre was lovable in comparison with the devils they dispelled. Yet the Ugandans and Kampuchians continued to suffer war and political instability, so the interventions were scarcely complete triumphs. They cannot justify a principle of stepping in against oppressive governments.

An isolated intervention naturally has a chance of success. The regime may collapse like a house of cards, and a good new government arise; some instances are readily cited. But usually things go neither easily nor well, and the outcome is uncertain to say the least. An

international policy should not rest on an attitude that is flexible and sensitive to opinion. Hope and faith in individual cases are no substitute for a consistent standpoint. In our view, the best approach would be a rigid declaration of nonintervention in "internal affairs". This is not due to respect for dictators' right to oppress their peoples, but because democracy and capitalism are alternatives which must be introduced as smoothly as possible by peaceful means, rather than by armed force.

Refusal to intervene can have drastic consequences, such as the genocide in Kampuchea. However, it is practically impossible to give a guarantee of democracy, or against oppression, in the same way as an anti-aggression guarantee. And it is important to have moral principles which are also realistic principles. An altruistic policy, with a limitless ambition to protect everyone against everything, leads ultimately to paralysis, or to a series of interferences that often fail dismally.

Instead, totalitarian regimes should be met with a "containment policy" of the kind that Churchill and Truman pursued against the Soviet Union after World War II. This is an Iron Curtain to keep misery from spreading to other countries through open aggression. One has to hope that, in the nation thus lost, democratic forces will undermine the regime. In today's world, no nation can shield itself from the liberal society's alternative, which is always conveyed by television and radio, shops and newspapers. The regime cannot neglect this alternative, or easily refute it. Allowing a tyranny to fall by its shaky hand, and the people's will to transform the system, is a better procedure than "democratic imperialism".

A relative compromise that may sound attractive is to establish protection for democratic regimes, with their own version of the Brezhnev doctrine: these countries could unite to defend "the advances of democracy". Even this would probably be unwise, since every democracy must be able to deal with its own internal enemies. The individual citizen should feel a responsibility and be prepared to shoulder it. No one else can have the task of guarding his interests - a totalitarian movement must be defeatable by domestic forces, whether at the ballot box or with weapons. The sheer idea and opportunity of evasion weakens a democracy's defensive power. Strength of will is just what an antidemocratic opposition tends to consider as its members' decisive feature, not their mediocre performance on election days. To cry for help from others is to concede a deficit of devoted followers. If a democracy cannot successfully be defended by its citizens against such an opposition, it has lost much of its legitimacy and perhaps neither can, nor should, be defended by others.

The aim of internationally securing democracy around the world received an early deathblow. President Wilson's intentions after World War I did not survive the Versailles peace conference. Not even during the democratic upswing at the beginning of the 1990s did the UN General Assembly have a democratic majority.<7> Experience does not show that the world can be secured for democracy, or that democracies can be protected against their internal enemies.

All who have seen films from World War II are ready to believe that the moral superiority of democracy makes its soldiers personally superior. This would be wonderful, but the contrary picture is probably more accurate. Democracy focuses on the individual's freedom and welfare, not on heroic death for a great cause. When death-defying self-denial is required, Nazis or Communists are often stronger. The orientation and capacities of democracy were well noted by General Patton in a speech to his troops, as impersonated by George C. Scott: "No bastard ever won a war by dying for his country. He won it by making the other poor dumb bastard die for his own country."

Since democracy has few advantages as a philosophy of war, it is essential to stay sober about political realities. Today there is enough superiority of weapons to make regulation feasible. As Churchill said, "The religion of blood and war stands face to face with that of peace. Fortunately, that of peace is better armed." The overwhelming significance of quantity for military confrontations was thoroughly confirmed by Clausewitz in his classic work "On War". Battles between unequal forces are rarely decided in the underdog's favor. Right and courage are paramount in the world of sagas and propaganda, but in reality the numbers of soldiers and their weapons tip the scales.

The main strength of democracy is peace, in regard to people's existence under normal conditions. Spokesmen of totalitarianism are wont to mock parliamentarianism for its bargaining, the politicians for their narrow perspective, and liberalism for its materialism, yet seldom democracy's basic principle - the sovereign power of the people's will. This they dislike, but cannot easily attack in a manner that spares their own claim to represent the "true" will of the people. Ever since divine monarchy disappeared as an alternative, democracy has held a very strong position of ultimate legitimacy. The same principle, combined with material performance, is the heavy artillery that wears down the opponent in a peaceful offensive.

A lack of prodemocratic intervention guides a democratic opposition in a totalitarian country to use a nonviolent strategy. If it has no hope of military support, there is no encouragement to start a civil war. This is a positive effect, as civil war is generally a worse option than the temporary persistence of tyranny.

In recent times, ever more people have spoken for a humanistic right to intervene. Not least identified with this policy is Bernard Kouchner, the prime mover of "Médecins sans Frontières". Not only a right, but a duty, exists to intervene against "the right of dictatorial regimes to torture and kill their own peoples".<8> But great human suffering does not turn a civil war into a humanitarian issue; it remains primarily a political issue. While the value of medicine and food must not be depreciated, they do not stop a war and can actually prolong it. Every soldier himself needs provisions and has a family whose survival is threatened by disruptions of supply, so a more humane war may mean less inhibition from armed conflict. A bitter truth lies in the thesis of General Helmuth von Moltke: fast, hard fighting methods are best because the chief humanitarian objective is that the war be brief. People are bound to suffer widely

in the destructive process of war. It is doubtless more constructive to stabilize and support the countries which have found a political solution, than to throw oneself into a witch's cauldron with armed might in order to promote democracy and/or humanity. In some conflicts, these values are not even substantially upheld by any of the combatants.

Thus, how shall we answer the original question about cooperation or isolationism? Democracies should not retreat to an isolationist or pacifist policy. A passive strategy does not bring peace, but offers opportunities for aggressive states to take what they want and ignore protests of principle. We do not wish to be attacked, and should act together against an attacker. Yet we ought to be satisfied with an intervention policy against attacks between states, not interfere militarily in internal conflicts. Before a massive and definite threat, an anti-aggression principle would be challenged on very few occasions. The day we begin to waver, understand, and turn the other cheek, there will be less peace. From the current confusion of debate, we must forge a limited, realistic and - most of all - stringent policy.

Slave morality

The above reasoning has mainly concerned a situation where the actor possesses extraordinary power, with practical possibilities of fighting fire with fire. A way of interpreting the Christian message of love is to see how it functions in a situation where the actor has almost no power.

For the earliest Christians, their chances of defeating the authorities by force were negligible, but influence through prayer and faith was conceivable. Love and altruism became weapons used by Christians as an alternative to David's sling against the pagan Goliath. Are the physical possibilities of defense so small that philosophical or psychological influence provides the best opportunities? Goliath lowers his sword because his own conscience now forbids him to swing it. Could a slave morality like Christianity's be good for slaves? A rule of the Roman empire indicate that there is such a possibility: *parcere subjectis et debellare superbos* - spare the submissive and demolish the proud men.

The author Väinö Linna has written of firing squads during the Finnish civil war: "In the gravel pit they often stared at their executioners until the last moment, eyes full of gloomy hatred. And the executioners stared back at them with the same look, over gunsights that could barely be seen in the dark of the spring night. Nobody screamed, nobody made trouble. There were only the eyes staring from each side, for this was a genuine Finnish hatred. Like a bog in the forest: black, cold, deep and murky." <9>

Another kind of behavior was shown by a priest, Novela, from the village of Torrijos during the Spanish civil war. Some Republican soldiers are discussing whether to crucify him, or to let him suffer and die for his god in a different way. Novela utters his last wish: to

be killed while facing them, so that he can bless and forgive his murderers. The priest undeniably exhibits self-control. Nor did this approach stop the execution, but presumably it put the most pressure on the enemy. It is harder to kill someone who says he likes his opponent than a person who wishes the warrior a painful death.

Years ago, a bank robbery became world-famous as the prototype of the "Stockholm syndrome". A desperate robber, with hostages, was besieged for days in a vault. Several of the hostages developed a sympathy for him, although he was holding them against their will and might murder them. This emotional reaction may at first seem odd, yet a rational explanation is forthcoming. If nothing effective can be done to get free, one should seek a means of psychological influence so as to avoid being shot. Feelings are often mutual. Concern, sympathy or love for the assailant must make it a bit more difficult for him to pull the trigger. Given no radical alternatives, an attempt to build up such a mental block is a plausible constructive act that the prisoner has a chance of performing. Perhaps the Christian message of love ought to be viewed as expressing, not a heavenly ideal, but an effort of the powerless to manipulate the powerful.

Human beings are almost as clever at seeing through games as at playing them. Therefore, it is necessary to play convincingly. As in many other situations, the path to successful deception frequently goes by way of self-deception. Whoever plays for his life will not want to put on a poor show; he must act credibly, so he adapts his feelings to the circumstances. A real emotion arises, which cannot be called true love; it is desperate love for the purpose of neutralizing an imminent threat.

This behavior should not be moralized over, but neither does it deserve to be praised and idealized. We can all comprehend emotional confusion in the face of a frightening attacker. There are, however, objections - of morality and of effectiveness - to the general philosophy of loving one's enemies.

Morally, of course, the best advice is to act as strongly as possible in favor of justice, instead of lying down before destructive forces. Tolerance is sometimes an apology for cowardice; to entertain an opponent with sermons about love is to go a step further in making a virtue of human weakness. An act that is explicable and defensible in an emergency should not be magnified into a universal good.

In terms of effectiveness, historical experience indicates little success. Neither the priest Novella, nor the Christians in the Colosseum at Rome, escaped a brutal death. The church's victories surely were not due to the counsel "Love thy enemies" being an excellent way to neutralize strong enemy forces. Its vigor and triumph owed to its being a superb instrument for persuading people to endure hardship and submit to a state power, of which the church became an important part.

Many well-armed animals have signal systems to inhibit continued aggression by others. A wolf's manner of baring its neck, to concede defeat and avoid further injury, functions nicely. But a comparable inhibition against human aggression does not exist. A downright war requires two parties, yet only one is needed in order to exercise

violence and oppression. To stop a sadist by becoming a masochist: this sounds more like a funny story than a successful strategy.

7.3 Separatism and internationalism

For a long time we have seen two developments growing in strength while, in some respects, they are mutually opposed: internationalism and ethnic separatism. The fundamental view of how this opposition should be dealt with in order to prevent conflicts is of primary concern, since conventional morality seems to be quite deficient. In general, an international outlook is not only praised, but also combined with various categorical opinions about the right of all peoples to self-determination, that is, to their own state. There is, in addition, one's right to a culture independent of national culture - the latter may take any form whatever, as long as it is multicultural. Still, a separate culture is the *raison d'être* of a separate state.

In a classification by Nielsson,<11> only 45 out of 164 states were national states with a homogeneous population. As Stanley Hoffman put it, "The world is full of Austria-Hungaries".<12>

An inability to distinguish among opposed principles would be less serious if it were not closely coupled to the problem of war and peace. As many brewing conflicts have an ethnic basis, the lack of a consistent moral approach to this problem is serious indeed. Since the Second World War, between 7 and 16 million people have been killed in ethnic conflicts.<13> Why the deficiency exists is easy to explain; in the absence of safe and simple solutions, it is tempting to fall back on a disguised opportunistic flexibility - on a few positron principles. We lend full support to diametrically opposed principal standpoints, and can then jump back and forth between them.

Orlando Patterson's reflection from 1977 still makes a valid point: "We know much, perhaps too much, about the Jews, the Blacks, the Irish, the Poles, but we still know little about the nature and extent of the ethnic revival, and even less about the thing-in-itself we call ethnicity."<14> That the parties in an ethnic conflict regard their situation as a unique injustice is not justified, but at least comprehensible. More disturbing is that the rest of the world, rather than seeking clear principles, contents itself with flexible universal rules, whose applications are guided by sympathy, antipathy and its own national interests. This is a good example of how altruistic benevolence leads to complete dissatisfaction. Pleasant talk about understanding, mutual respect, and willingness to negotiate is not enough. The goal should be to find, not the Perfect Solution in the best of all worlds, but a sound solution for a quarrelsome world.

Much of the foreign support for separatist movements is due to the foreigner's attitude toward other questions which are more important for him. The wider objectives we attribute to separatism are decisive. Croatian separatism was long tarnished by the Ustasa fascists who aided the Nazis during World War II; next it was justified by contrast to the dominant view of Serbia as the tool of old Communists. Palestinian

terrorism is a weighty argument against a Palestinian state. Dislike of the central powers in Franco's Spain or the Soviet Union, for instance, has encouraged approval of their separatists. To an outsider, the overriding conflict is that between democracy and dictatorship, east and west, or rich and poor - a struggle in which certain separatist movements become allied forces. When we endorse separatism, its allure often lies elsewhere.

If democracy wins the struggle against dictatorship, the alliance with separatism often collapses. It turns into an obstacle which, to the external observer, appears needless since a new government has grave difficulties to overcome and wastes energy on national symbols. A great drawback of the separatist concept is that it rarely advances a viable solution to the problem it addresses. The dissatisfied minority ceases to be a minority in the new country, yet new minorities arise, showing that the essential dilemma has been dispelled only in the eyes of extreme optimists. When it comes to breaking whole regions out of the old state, separatism always has high ambitions. As every political movement strives to offer its supporters the best, few from the minority group end up on the wrong side of a new border, but many from the majority group do so. One further reason is that the majority group has frequently migrated into the minority's historical homeland, and historical borders play a key role when a new state is formed.

Thus, such a division produces the old problem with reversed roles: the new state inherits a significant minority from the old majority group. The separatists take a casual view of this outcome, with propaganda that naturally represents them as better than their opponents, and promises a fairer treatment of minority issues. Sadly, they are being unrealistic, for a separation inevitably exacerbates the groups' differences and gives the little country an even lower chance of thriving with two peoples than the previous state had. Separatists are eager to emphasize their democratic virtues, including nondiscrimination and equal human rights. One would be very naive to believe that the ethnic discord which has disintegrated a state will suddenly become so modest as to be mastered with a new, benevolent leadership.

A further risk of conflict occurs if a large neighboring country proves sensitive to discrimination, actual or imagined, of its national group. In the current upheaval, we see some countries evaporating, like Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, which were much larger than their main groups. They are being replaced by countries smaller than their national groups. Serbs number more than half a million in Croatia and 1.5 million in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and there are 25 million Russians outside Russia. If separatism is to solve the problems it claims to cope with, its perspective must be altered somewhat. The sacredness of a given border is seldom obvious, since both the latest border and the restored "rightful" one are results of war and power, which require strong grounds for changing the status quo. As with any change, a qualitative improvement should be demanded to justify the cost and trouble involved.

A new alternative

The most sensible course is to discuss a new border in terms of new criteria and to consider a radical plan. If priority is granted to cultural separation, the first question arises: how can a border be drawn to leave as few people as possible in the "wrong" state? A seemingly fair rule is that equally many people from each group should be wrongly placed. The second aim is that the border ought to be as natural as possible. Disconnected enclaves are worth avoiding, as they invite conflict over barriers and call for cooperation which may be hard to maintain.

A separatist solution is analogous to a divorce. As warmly as we advocate living in harmony and mutual respect, a breakdown in practice means that it is presumably better to divide the domain than to endure unity dominated by conflict. Like a private household, national property is then a stumbling-block to be split. According to present-day procedure, separatists get either nothing or too much. The majority group does not necessarily lose by getting a smaller country; it gains if a long-term, peaceful solution is established, in which it avoids the problem of a (rightly or not) paranoid minority. Both states may get more favorable conditions with a unified population and less territory.

Even if a border is drawn as proposed above, some people will find themselves on a wrong side of it. What can be done? A model could consist of three principles: each country is responsible for accepting people of its own nationality, each country is entitled to evict members of the other group, and each individual may emigrate to the "right" country. The implications are that a step toward monoculture is taken, and that whoever is allowed and willing to stay on a wrong side of the border faces worse conditions. Yet these are inevitable in carrying out the chosen separation. Half-measures are not so radical, but neither do they solve the problems which were regarded as insoluble in a shared state.

As for deciding upon separation, a normally democratic judgement should not be thought sufficient. This decision is fundamental and deserves a two-thirds majority, as is required for constitutional amendments in many countries. By the analogy with divorce, it should also be enough that one of the parties wants out. A reason why separatist movements often lean toward terrorism is that the democratic process seems arduous: one's own ideas are opposed by a permanent majority in terms of "us against them". It is, however, a sign of weak faith in separatist ideas to admit that a two-thirds majority within one's own group is unattainable.

The rule about equal exchange of populations is plausible in cases where the groups have long lived together - as in Sri Lanka, Bulgaria or Canada. But when a group has recently arrived, more or less in the baggage of an occupying army, as in the Baltic states or East Timor, its situation is different and merits a much smaller portion of the redistributed land.

However, such "ethnic cleansing" bears an odor of Stalinist deportation. Allowing everybody to stay put is attractive, but hardly

ideal if the groups do not wish to cohabit. A proposal for fair ethnic separation is painful for several reasons. The majority group usually supports "the nation's sacred frontiers" while the minority dreams of a large mini-country: one which can hold all of their own group, along with a few others whom they promise to treat well. Foreign observers strike an alliance with this or that side, and pursue a policy of requesting cease-fires, a positive will to negotiate, and further details of a humanitarian profile, scarcely contributing any real solution to the two antagonistic options.

A separation is, in itself, no appealing conclusion when it entails severe costs and tragedies for people who are torn from their homes and friends across the ethnic gap. It inspires scandal reports in the press and inflames feelings. None of the combatants see it as a favorite alternative, so what is there to say for it? The main point, though, is not whether it will be pleasant, but whether other choices are better or worse. A look at those available reveals nothing which comes near to tackling the problems in the long run. Whoever supposed that deep, persistent ailments have easy, cheap, painless cures? Apart from belief in a holy, eternal marriage and indulgence in bilateral window-smashing, we must consider the "civilized divorce".

With this approach, separation is not a welcome escalation of a conflict that has already had terribly negative effects, but a way to resolve the conflict and pass beyond it. Nor is the divorce a means of exacting redress and revenge; both parties would recognize the futility of seeking support for a martyr's role by exposing old wounds and historical injustices. A happy separation is a romantic illusion, whereas a civilized divorce should be a valid alternative. In the wake of "fundamental incompatibility", this is perhaps the best solution.

Other alternatives

Efforts have been made in some countries with division of power and coexistence between the leaders of different ethnic groups. They may succeed temporarily, as in Lebanon until 1976. A quota was applied between the Muslims and Maronite Christians, while prominent positions were reserved for a particular ethnic group; the president was to be a Maronite, the prime minister a Sunni Muslim, the Speaker a Shiite. Another example is Zambia, which for some time managed with a policy of "tribal balancing". Such so-called consociationalism is often advocated by social scientists.<15>

Still, a balance is difficult to keep, as well as, in our view, inconsistent with democratic principle and method. In a democracy the basic idea ought to be that all citizens are equal regardless of ethnicity, gender and so on. Therefore, to adopt a quota system and a group mentality is to take a collision course which easily fosters and deepens ethnic division, resulting in de facto partition. Minority overrepresentation (Zimbabwe 1980) and ethnic veto (Cyprus 1960) are in disharmony with the central norm of universal suffrage.

There are other preferable kinds of constitutional engineering

that try to increase possibilities of keeping together an ethnically divided society. Federalism, executive presidents, alternative vote with demands for a majority of the votes (Sri Lanka 1978) and single transferable vote (Northern Ireland 1973) are solutions within the limits of democracy.<16>

Different ethnic categories

Many multiethnic states have great trouble in preserving their unity. The chief factor is linguistic diversity; even in mature democracies such as Canada and Belgium, the language barrier is central. A heterogeneous population poses a problem not only in the Second and Third Worlds. The principle of agreement between state and nationality, often called irredentism, is always a strong candidate for solving it.

Certain other distinctions may also at times create an identification persuasive enough to provide grounds for ethnic separatism. Yuwa Wong lists five recognition markers - language, religion, phenotype, homeland, and a myth of common descent - that together contribute to the feeling of a separate ethnic identity.<17> It is commonly believed that race is actually the primary distinction, being the most tangible one. This opinion is probably derived in large part from American ethnocentrism. The origins of ethnic opposition, nearly without exception, lie in conflicts many generations old. Physical conflict presupposes closeness, and the neighbors are normally similar in race. Mutual ignorance leads to noncommitment, but not to hatred. Nor do long distances or very different appearances and cultures make an emotional powderkeg. The explosiveness comes from bad experiences: history outweighs pigment. Hatred is what prevails between Serbs and Croats, Turks and Kurds, Tamils and Singhalese. In the USA, a peculiar ethnic conflict exists between whites and blacks which, in our America-centered world, has become an archetype of conflict. On that view, further nationalistic quarrels are variants of racism - pigment is the root of antagonisms and, when blacks are missing, the fascists exercise stand-in racism by attacking some other group.

The appeal of racism depends, too, on its television image. For a drowsy audience, the conflict in Sri Lanka is hard to assess. As the natives look alike, the question of who kills whom can be both visually and analytically confusing. Corpses show little contrast. Two white South African policemen beating a black demonstrator with batons are much more impressive, since the difference is plain even to the uninformed.

A consequence of seeing great dissimilarity as the main cause of group conflicts is that one soon yields to a facile sort of solution: a bit of "education", more understanding and respect, and more personal experience of the opposite group will stop all the noise. This "contact hypothesis" has been effectively criticized.<18> To change an attitude, there is a need for constructive cooperation. Only a strong "you and me" relationship can wipe out a negative "us against them". Contact by itself is not enough.

That an increased level of education should result in a more tolerant view of other groups seems to be a reasonable forecast. Unfortunately there is weak support for such causality. From a number of international studies of divided societies, Donald Horowitz draws the disturbing conclusion that "There are some studies indicating that elites are less ethnocentric than their followers, but there are more showing that ethnocentrism increases with education."<19>

Numerous groups of non-ethnic kinds interpret themselves as a distinct category. There are feminists who consider women to be a group comparable with blacks, although the parallel is misleading; a woman has a close relationship to her son regardless of her relation to feminism. Nor do social classes constitute ethnic groups in this context; even if they live apart with little social mobility, they are economically integrated. Society is full of subcultures, so we must place limits on what amounts to an ethnic group, since it cannot be a right for everyone claiming group membership to form a breakaway state. The present argument is not to favor opportunities for free financial monarchies and local hippie communes. In order to "qualify" as such a group, suitable requirements are at least a century of traditions within the country, and a minimum number of individuals. If separation has the purpose of merging with another state, it is fair to lower the minimum.

The subcultures are an interesting aspect of the problem, while lacking the status of ethnic groups. Countless people regard their connection with one or more subgroups as essential, and a partition of the state has an impact on the subgroups. For a pro-environmental entrepreneur, the issue arises of how those concerns will be influenced by an ethnic division of the country. There is no mechanism preferring ethnic identity over other loyalties or priorities. Neither should allegiance to the existing state be forgotten; one can naturally see oneself first and foremost as a Czechoslovak, not a Czech or Slovak.

Principles and solutions

Various important questions await refinement after our brief discussion, but the outlines of an approach to separatism should now be clear. Still clearer is the need for a systematic model. That each instance of ethnic conflict has been handled as a special case, without consistent reference to others, is a striking defect. The usual principles of the debate cannot be taken seriously as attempts to fulfill the criterion of universality. Sentimental, sticky humanism readily mixes with naked group egoism. Hard-boiled separatists are touted as bicultural enthusiasts if only they can gain power. A good separatist, we hear, is not a separatist at all, so the problem solves itself.

One key advantage of the proposed treatment is that it gives separatists a democratic option, enabling them to act within the system and make nonviolence more fruitful than a war of ethnic liberation. Many separatist movements lack the popular support for their ideas which they

believe or say that they have; but with this model, they can obtain a decision from the people whose wishes they claim to represent. Democratic judgement has often helped to calm excited demands; in most cases there will probably be a reduction of ethnic antagonism, and it will eventually resemble the relations among other subgroups. Ethnic affiliation may be widely valued, yet it need not cause any profound rift between a particular group and the rest of society.

Once an international model has been developed, the first step is to ensure that democratic states apply it. However, no international guarantee should be given for such a policy, as this would contradict the restrictive approach we have recommended. Democracy and freedom should, in our view, be won by internal forces - not imported by pro-democratic imperialism. But a broadly accepted principle can be of vast significance even without a guarantee. The principle could ally the separatist movements with the democratic opposition in dictatorial states; and with an established model for deciding differences of opinion about national unity, the separatists can devote their entire energy to supporting the country's democratic movement as a whole. Peaceful, democratic solutions to their special problems are the second step. Far from being a plot to deceive the separatists, it is a realistic plan for change, since totalitarian regimes are usually quite unwilling to relinquish territory. To get "the Russians out of the Baltic states", one must begin by getting "the Bolsheviks out of Russia".

A common attitude toward separatists is to be positive in specific cases while hinting criticism in general, as there ought not to be any separatists in a well-functioning democracy. If they do exist, something is wrong, but this should be corrected instead of splitting the country.

However, we think it would be wiser to grant the separatists a solid opportunity of proving the appeal of their ideas. And when they meet with strong support, the relations between ethnic groups are likely to be of the kind that makes separation the best solution.

In the great majority of situations, they will not win enough support - the solution proposed above is not so ideal as to earn an ethnic group's automatic support for separatism. The power of nationalism would be exaggerated by assuming that it sweeps away a group in euphoria as soon as it is allowed to emerge, and that giving the separatists a chance will open Pandora's Box and shake every country with internal schisms. Such suspicion owes largely to mistrust of the democratic premise that peoples understand their own interests. Many a demagogue's programs plead to vices like envy and self-pity. Separatists are not necessarily worse than other politicians.

What count in the end are actual conditions, not propaganda. If one group is exploited by another, the seeds of separatism are sown; but if the conditions are good, the possibility of arousing dissatisfaction is very limited. Sometimes a devilish scenario unfolds: when one group is sufficiently hateful, untruthful, and so forth, it defeats more decent parties, victory going to those who hit below the belt. Evidence for this is scant in democracies, though. Even if the separatists' arguments are demonized, there is no reason to expect that they will

reap an easy harvest.

Democracy faces a much harder task in dealing with terrorism, however little support the latter has. If separatism can gain adherents by adopting peaceful behavior and abandoning terrorism, the overwhelming winner is social harmony. Society is better off with ten democratic separatists for each terroristic separatist.

Our point is not to support the incompatibility position - the thesis that democracy cannot work in an ethnically divided state.<20> But we think that a separatistic solution has to be a democratic and peaceful possibility. We are, however, even more critical toward different alternatives of consociationalism. These are temporary compromises rather than long-term solutions. The strong alternative to separatism is a liberal society that treats its citizens as individuals and not as members of groups. Ethnic background can then be one of the factors that give each individual a unique personal identity, instead of being perceived as the distinguishing factor that makes him uniform to one group and different from another.

There are several objections to our proposed solution. The most fundamental are those that are opposed not only to the specific principles proposed here, but to stringent principles as such. These are seen as mechanical, simplistic and destructive. This fundamental critique can be divided into four alternative perspectives: Time, Sympathy, Authority and Legality.

Time

The world economy is rapidly integrating and an international culture is being shaped by media, travel, immigration, and multinational companies. Different groups are getting closer in habits and interdependence, so separatism should be a thing of the past. What we see now is the emergence of an international monoculture.

It is easy to be persuaded by this line of reasoning - that time will make ethnic conflict obsolete. This might be the long-term development, but the political development of our century has been the reverse: the disintegration of several multicultural empires and a continuous creation of new states.

Even if a global monoculture will be the future of man, the present trend can very well continue. External threats have always been a reason for cooperation, and a more peaceful environment might offer better prospects for a small separate state. An organization like NATO provides a security that previously could be provided only by a strong state. Belgium can now be split without threats of foreign annexation.

Economic cooperation - as in the EU or NAFTA - increases the opportunities for an economy of scale without a substantial national home market. The solution for Africa might be a greater number of states combined with an organization for free trade and economic cooperation.

Another objection is that much of the new ethnicity is fake - in Eric Hobsbawm's words, "traditions are invented".<21> Patterson makes

"revivalist" a main category of ethnocentrism.<22> A showcase of revival of roots is the current popularity among some American blacks to turn themselves into "Afro-Americans". For emerging nations like the Ukraine and Palestine, there is a special need to create an ethnic identity with a separate and continuous history. The attraction of the national socialists for a glorious Aryan past was not an exception, but the rule. Unfortunately, unreal myths have not made conflict and war any less real.

Sympathy

The main thing in this perspective is not to distinguish between right and wrong actions, but which side to support. One rule of sympathy is to take sides with the group in a conflict that sympathizes with your own group. Although common, this is hard to defend as an intellectual rule with ethical relevance for people belonging to other groups. The more respected norm, which we would label "pity-priority", is that one should support the weak against the strong. This attitude might seem nice, but is disastrous if peace is considered to be of value. It is hard to find a more effective rule for prolonging war and conflict than to support the weaker side.

The second fatal weakness of pity-priority is that situations change rapidly and today's villains are tomorrow's victims. Some relatively prosperous groups like Jews, Kulaks and Tutsis have been criticized for being overprivileged - for being the oppressive villains. For these groups, drastic changes took place, from overprivilege to the ultimate underprivilege: victims of genocide.

An irony occurs when one group, such as the Turks, assumes both kinds of roles. Turkey objects indignantly to Bulgaria's forced assimilation of a Turkish minority, at the same time as a very similar policy is enforced against the Kurds in Turkey.

That the poor man has a heart of gold is an attractive populist thesis, but it is not sufficient to make stringent rules. In most conflicts, both sides can firmly convince their supporters that they are the prime victims of the conflict and deserve sympathy according to the rule of pity-priority. In addition, the weak party is often excused for voicing master-myths of the past and dominant aspirations for the future. The old opposition is turned into the new oppressor; national liberation has frequently meant liberation for one group and impairments for others.

Authority

A further objection is that the problem with separatistic conflicts is not a lack of useful principles, but a lack of authority. This is, of course, the backbone attitude of any politician: he has the solution and all he needs is the means, a mandate, and a "Go!"

This objection, too, was stronger ten years ago. Today the UN has

the means, but its inability to accomplish results cannot be covered up by demands for more men and money. An omnipotent Leviathan could bring peace, but that possibility is not attractive for most of us, even if it could be materialized.

Several states have made attempts at forced assimilation, but with counterproductive results. It can be argued that strong dictatorships have succeeded in suppressing secessionist movements, yet this is hardly an attractive solution. The democratic precondition is that the rulers do not have the omnipotence to make everyone obey whatever is decided. The decisions have to be sufficiently reasonable to be accepted even when in conflict with short-term interests - that is, they have to be perceived as legitimate. Thus, authority is not enough, but the proposed solution must be an option within limits.

When authority is highlighted, legitimacy is forgotten and unrealistic expectations are attached to "summit meetings". It is problematic to reach a sudden peacemaking agreement without a previous peacebuilding process, which prepares one's supporters for peace and compromise instead of war for total victory.

All political parties influence what are considered legitimate decisions through their own agitation; a cause declared sacred cannot easily be compromised. Parties close to gaining governmental power have a strong incentive to adjust their message - to sacrifice some pre-election attractiveness of excessive promises, and gain greater legitimacy for difficult but necessary priorities. Parties far from a point of responsible implementation are more inclined simply to maximize their appeal. Unfortunately, international commentators are basically just such irresponsible co-actors, more interested in what a conflict can do for their image than in what can be done to solve the conflict.

The authoritarian view promotes free hands for the deal-makers because each problem is seen as very complex and quite special. Exclusive information, personal chemistry, and the dynamics of the process are essential components, so naturally there has to be an *ad hoc* solution. The bystanders encourage the process through supportive sweet-talk for vague or limited goals; children writing postcards for peace, as well as general condemnations of the evilness of war, are seen as valuable contributions.

Already Aristotle noted that good law makes good order. Laws with low legitimacy are hard even for a powerful police force to uphold.

Legality

Efforts have often been made to transform separatism from a political into a legal question; ethnic demands past a certain level are outlawed. It is possible to draw a fairly clear line between demonstrations and terrorism, but not between ethnicity and separatism.

An ethnic movement can start with minor demands, develop into *incremental dissociation*, and later become a movement for *secession stricto sensu*. If claims to be a separate national group were

forbidden, this would merely impose a minor adjustment of advocated opinions. Free speech would be tarnished and nothing gained. Not only the beliefs of the minority can be highlighted, but also the way in which the majority considers such claims.<23>

The proponents of unity ought, of course, to argue their case as best they can, but there can be no guarantee of success. With a loss of souls to the separatists, there has to be, in our opinion, a fall-back alternative. Separatism cannot be transformed from a political choice into a matter of policing. The need is to make this political decision a choice between solutions that are realistic and acceptable.

7 Summary

In this treatment of international and ethnic conflicts, we suggest that altruistic principles are incapable of solving problems and, instead, tend to increase the confusion. A frequent criticism of imperialism is its economic exploitation of colonies, assuming that empires are built on an economic rationale. But empires do not balance profits with losses, and examples like Britain and Russia indicate that the people at home gain little or nothing from colonies. What drives imperialism is the interest of leaders, often employing a higher aim such as God, socialism and civilization - an altruistic aim generating a crusading potential.

International politics must rest upon realistic principles that one is willing to pursue, not lofty ambitions and attractive altruistic ideas. We believe that it would be in the self-interest of most countries to establish a collective security against attacks, and that an anti-aggression policy can be applied consistently. A corresponding guarantee in regard to oppression or conflicts within countries is, however, difficult to defend, and for purely democratic reasons. In general there is no democratic support for intervention in another nation's conflicts, and democracy is an institution that does not benefit from military clashes. Its strength is seen in times of peace, and it has to prove that it can stand on its own legs.

Ethnic conflicts have been seriously aggravated by flexible and contradictory universal rules, such as every people's right to self-determination and every nation's advantage in being multicultural. Many separatist solutions are unsatisfactory because the original group conflict is maintained - a new state contains a minority of the previous majority. It is difficult to see that altruism offers any cure for these conflicts. We propose a model for how a difference of opinion between national unity and separation should be resolved: a "civilized divorce" where the desire of one party to separate is sufficient. Undoubtedly not all readers share our concrete proposals, yet it should be highly probable that these constitute a potential basis for finding the solutions required. Symptomatic is the discussion of Bosnia, which has been a bonanza for the tabloid press and for indignant politicians, the professional criers of our time. Everybody claims that the war is insane, but there is a shortage of sane and

robust solutions. A cease-fire is too little, while love, peace and understanding are too much to expect.

With a view to altruism's role in the issues of war and peace examined above, a critical judgement can be made. Altruism perceives a lack of sympathy and benevolence, but one often suspects that this perception serves mainly to present the altruist as a humane person. Constructiveness in altruistic solutions is never conspicuous; they amount chiefly to a continuous complaint over something which is actually thought insoluble. The principles advanced here attempt to find solutions on another basis, that of realism in harmony with self-interest.

Notes Chapter 7. War and peace - and reciprocity

1. Hobson, *Imperialism*; Lenin, Vladimir I. *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism*
2. Tuchman, *The March of Folly*.
3. Johnson, *Modern Times*, p. 356 and p. 362.
4. Hitler, *Mein Kampf*, p. 490.
5. *The Economist*, June 12 1993.
6. Hobbes, *Leviathan*, p. 223.
7. Fukuyama, *The End of History and The Last Man*, p. 50, classified 61 of the worlds states as democracies in 1990.
8. *Newsweek*, January 18 1993.
9. Väinö Linna, *Upp trälär*, p. 369.
10. Hugh Thomas *The Spanish Civil War*, p. 271.
- 11 Gurr and Harff (1988)
- 12 Patterson, *Ethnic Chauvinism: The Reactionary Impulse*.
- 13 Nielsson (1985).
- 14 Ryan, *Ethnic Conflict and International Relations*, p. XV
- 15 Lijphart, *Democracy in Plural Societies*, Nordlinger, *Conflict Regulation in Divided Societies*, Heraclides, *The Selfdetermination of Minorities in International Politics*.
- 16 Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*.
- 17 Wong (1994).
- 18 Darby, *Intimidation and Control of the Conflict in Northern Ireland*; Foster & Finchilescu (1986); Hewstone & Brown, *Contact and Conflict in Intergroup Encounters*.
- 19 Horowitz, *A Democratic South Africa*, p. 140.
- 20 Furnival (1977); Smith (1971), (1986).
- 21 Schlesinger, *The Disuniting of America: Reflections on a Multicultural Society*, p. 85
- 22 Patterson *Ethnic Chauvinism: The Reactionary Impulse*.
- 23 Lustick *Unsettled States, Disputed Lands*.